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Abstract
The paper examines ideological segregation among Ukrainian users in online 
environments, using as a case study partisan news communities on Vkontakte, the 
largest online platform in post-communist states. Its findings suggest that despite 
their insignificant numbers, partisan news communities attract substantial attention 
from Ukrainian users and can encourage the formation of isolated ideological 
cliques – or ‘echo chambers’ – that increase societal polarisation. The paper also 
investigates factors that predict users’ interest in partisan content and establishes 
that the region of residence is the key predictor of selective consumption of pro-
Ukrainian or pro-Russian partisan news content.
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Introduction
The advent of digital media, in particular social networking sites (SNSs), has had a sig-
nificant impact on news consumption worldwide. The decreased costs of content 
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production and distribution together with the adoption of data-driven techniques for user 
profiling and targeting allow both traditional and alternative news providers to reach 
their audiences through a multitude of socially mediated channels and formats. However, 
the growing digitisation of news industries also raises numerous concerns, varying from 
the possible abuse of users’ personal data and privacy by news providers (Helberger, 
2016; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2017) to the manipulation of the public sphere through 
fake news and disinformation (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Lazer et al., 2018; Tandoc 
et al., 2018). 
One of the major concerns about the use of SNSs in the context of news consumption 
is related to the threat of ideological segregation – that is, the tendency among consumers 
to limit themselves to the content which is likely to confirm their earlier views (Flaxman 
et al., 2016; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011). Frequently discussed in the context of ‘selec-
tive exposure’ (Stroud, 2008), ‘filter bubbles’ (Pariser, 2011) and ‘echo chambers’ 
(Sunstein, 2017), ideological segregation can undermine the shared public agenda by 
leading to the formation of isolated social groups, which nurture biases and limit the 
societal participation of their members. It can also facilitate the formation of discrimina-
tory views and subsequent radicalisation by diminishing the exposure to opposing opin-
ions; such a threat is particularly pronounced in the case of societies characterised by a 
high degree of polarisation (e.g. in the case of a political crisis or a military conflict).
A number of academic studies (Flaxman et al., 2016; Hahn et al., 2015; Saez-Trumper 
et al., 2013) use exposure to partisan news content as an indicator of ideological segrega-
tion. Hahn et al. (2015) show that subscription to accounts of specific news outlets on 
Twitter follows partisan lines and is influenced by demographic variables such as gender 
and age. Similarly, Flaxman et al. (2016) note that users who regularly read partisan 
news content online tend to expose themselves only to a single side of the ideological 
spectrum. Gruzd and Roy (2014) suggest that selective exposure on social media can 
increase partisanship and polarisation, which, in our view, is especially alarming for 
societies with a high degree of political polarisation.
In our study, we are looking at how online news consumption interacts with ideologi-
cal segregation in Ukraine. Our choice of case study is motivated by two major factors. 
First, Ukraine is a country in transition in terms of digital innovations and their adapta-
tion by the news market. Similar to most post-Soviet countries, Ukraine is characterised 
by low Internet penetration rate when compared with Western Europe (Kharchenko, 
2016); however, the country is currently experiencing fast development of internet infra-
structure (Freedom House, 2017) together with an explosive growth of information tech-
nology (IT) industries (Kirilenko and Tyshchuk, 2018). By examining the case of 
Ukraine, we strive to go beyond the current focus on the small set of Western countries 
characterised by a high level of technological innovations as well as their legislative 
regulations and to produce observations which can be applied to other countries which 
undergo a similar transition towards datafied media industries.
Second, since 2014, Ukraine has been experiencing conflict between the central gov-
ernment and separatist forces backed by Russia. Under conditions of limited information 
supply from the conflict zone caused both by censorship and limited possibilities for 
journalists’ access to the frontline, digital media, in particular SNSs, turn into a major 
source of news both in Ukraine and in other separatist republics (Makhortykh and 
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Sydorova, 2017; Pantti, 2016). While online news channels are less susceptible to cen-
sorship and the control of authorities, many of them are dominated by pro-Ukrainian and 
pro-Russian partisan media outlets, leading to significant biases in their coverage of the 
conflict and the subsequent polarisation of the Ukrainian public (Karamshuk et al., 2016; 
Zhukov and Baum, 2016). Often, these news channels are also instrumentalised as a 
means of information warfare, and used for the distribution of fake and propagandist 
content and stigmatisation of political opponents (Khaldarova and Pantti, 2017).
Based on this, we argue that the case of Ukraine is of particular interest for studying the 
impact of SNSs on online news consumption under conditions of high ideological segrega-
tion and intense information warfare. To achieve this purpose, we examine how a large 
sample of Ukrainian users consume digital news content on Vkontakte, a Russian SNS 
which remains highly popular in Ukraine despite it being banned by the Ukrainian authori-
ties. By doing so, we specifically address three aspects related to news consumption on the 
SNS. First, we compare the visibility of online news communities, in particular those that 
are devoted to partisan news content, with other types of SNS communities (e.g. entertain-
ment-related ones). Second, we examine if partisan news communities actually lead to 
ideological segregation (e.g. by creating conditions for the formation of ‘echo chambers’). 
Third, we identify contextual factors (e.g. geographic and demographic variables) that pre-
dict users’ interest in pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian partisan news content.
Theoretical background
In today’s media ecologies, SNSs constitute an integral component of the process of 
news distribution and consumption. A growing number of media organisations and jour-
nalists employ SNSs as a part of their content distribution routines extending their reach 
and adopting novel news formats (Newman, 2011; Russell, 2011; Thurman and 
Schifferes, 2012). The use of SNSs allows users to engage with news in a multitude of 
ways by commenting, liking and sharing specific stories across their personal networks 
(Hermida et al., 2012). By navigating these networks of contacts and connecting to other 
people and communities, SNS users are able to expand their information diets by select-
ing stories to read instead of selecting news outlets (Messing and Westwood, 2014); 
however, these novel selection capabilities also undermine the agenda-setting potential 
of legacy outlets and facilitate the distribution of fake and manipulative content, which 
can increase societal polarisation.
The content provided through SNSs, however, is not limited exclusively to news; 
instead, as De Zuniga et al. (2012) note, online content often focuses on entertainment 
and not public affairs. This argument is supported both by user surveys (Nielsen and 
Schrøder, 2014) and large-scale studies of SNS content, for instance on Twitter (Gerlitz 
and Rieder, 2013), which find that only a small portion of content is devoted to news and 
that users themselves do not necessarily view SNS as a major source for news. Similarly, 
the analysis of user behaviour indicates a small percentage of online news consumers 
contrasting with the higher self-reported values of news consumption (Flaxman et al., 
2016; Kleppe and Otte, 2017).
The contradiction between the significant potential of SNSs as a means of news dis-
tribution and the uneven degree of actual realisation of this potential prompts the need to 
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assess the presence of news content within specific platforms compared with other types 
of content. Such an assessment of content preferences is essential for understanding the 
political implications of a specific medium through which the content is consumed 
(Prior, 2005). Consequently, we argue that comparing the distribution of news and non-
news content is important for assessing the role of SNSs in the context of partisan news 
consumption online. Hence, the first research question we address in our paper is:
RQ1: What is the place of news content, including partisan news content, on Vkontakte 
as compared with other types of content (e.g. entertainment)?
Following the identification of the overall place of online news content on Vkontakte, 
we move towards examining its impact on partisan news consumption1 and assessing if it 
actually leads to ideological segregation. Following earlier studies, we interpret ideological 
segregation as a tendency of users to consume disparate news content based on their pre-
existing views that leads to the formation of fragmented news communities (Flaxman 
et al., 2013, 2016). However, unlike Flaxman et al. (2013), who use an audience-based 
approach to identify the partisan slant of specific news outlets and differentiate between 
pro-Republican and pro-Democratic outlets, we followed Hahn et al. (2015) and adopted a 
content-based approach2 to identify the partisanship of specific SNS communities. We also 
differentiated between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian partisan communities because this 
construct is particularly applicable for measuring partisanship in Ukraine in the context of 
the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict (Karamshuk et al., 2016).
The increase in the levels of audience fragmentation is a prominent concern in con-
nection to news consumption on SNSs. It causes moral panic relating to the perspective 
of the formation of isolated ideological communities in the form of ‘filter bubbles’ 
(Pariser, 2011) or ‘echo chambers’ (Sunstein, 2017). The division of the audience into 
isolated clusters can lead to ideological segregation, which is detrimental for the shared 
public sphere, and increase societal polarisation; in the longer perspective, ideological 
segregation can result in the radicalisation and reinforcement of internal divides, which 
can erode the foundations of democratic systems (Beaufort, 2018).
The concerns about the impact of online news consumption on audience fragmenta-
tion, however, so far have found little empirical support (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 
2016). Instead, a number of studies (Flaxman et al., 2016; Mukerjee et al., 2018) demon-
strate that communities of digital news consumers do not form isolated ideological clus-
ters, but their audiences instead frequently overlap with each other. Mukerjee et al. 
(2018) show that audience networks are often centred around digital outlets of legacy 
media, which have disproportional reach compared with other outlets – in particular, the 
more partisan ones. Similar observations are reported by Flaxman et al. (2016) who 
argue that news consumption on social media not only reinforces mainstream – and non-
partisan – interpretations, but also allows users to expose themselves to opposing views 
and diversify their information diets.
At the same time, the majority of studies mentioned above focus on Western demo-
cratic societies, which are often characterised by rather low degrees of ideological segre-
gation. Even in the case of the US, where the degree of partisanship is high, the society 
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is less ideologically segregated than in many non-Western countries, which suffer from 
extreme political polarisation. Romenskyy et al. (2018) note that in these non-Western 
contexts, ideological segregation has a significant detrimental effect on the public sphere, 
leading to the escalation of hate crimes, political instability and violence; in some cases, 
it can also result in armed conflicts, such as the one currently occurring in Eastern 
Ukraine. Under such extreme conditions, not only is the impact of ideological segrega-
tion more visible than in the case of democratic systems, but the necessity to deal with it 
is also significantly more pressing as the persistence of segregated communities can lead 
to the aggravation of hostilities and undermine conflict resolution efforts (Hoffmann, 
2014; Lynch et al., 2016).
For these reasons, we emphasise the importance of advancing research on potential 
polarising effects of online news consumption beyond the current focus on Western 
media systems, and specifically towards the societies which are already characterised by 
high degrees of partisanship. In this vein, we align with several existing studies 
(Duvanova et al., 2015; Gruzd and Tsyganova, 2015; Karamshuk et al., 2016) and sug-
gest using the case of Ukraine to examine whether under the condition of high ideologi-
cal segregation, online news outlets in a particular society turn into isolated partisan 
communities or their audiences still overlap, thus enabling the exposure of readers to 
different opinions on the ongoing strife. Thus, the second research question we discuss 
in the paper is:
RQ2: Is the consumption of partisan news content accompanied by the formation of 
isolated ideological communities (i.e. ‘filter bubbles’)?
Lastly, we examine the factors influencing user involvement with partisan news 
sources, which is another urgent subject of academic inquiry on online news consump-
tion (Hahn et al., 2015; Mitchell et al., 2015; Taneja et al., 2018). Taneja et al. (2018) 
note the role of age in their analysis of online news consumption by baby boomers and 
millennials: despite a number of similarities between the two age groups, the former 
tended to consume news from the digital outlets of legacy media and favoured more 
conservative outlets, whereas the latter preferred more liberal news sources. At the same 
time, Mitchell et al. (2015) found that older users are inclined to consume news aligning 
with their views more than younger news consumers. By contrast, some other demo-
graphic variables (e.g. gender (Chyi and Lee, 2013) seem to have a limited impact both 
on online news consumption in general, and partisan news consumption in particular. 
In the case of Ukraine, Duvanova et al. (2015) emphasise the importance of geo-
graphic factors – that is, the region where the user lives – in online partisanship. The 
significance of these specific factors is related to the regional divide of the Ukrainian 
political sphere, in particular the south-east versus north-west geographical division 
between pro-Russian and pro-Western voters (Clem and Craumer, 2008; Duvanova 
et al., 2015). In the case of online news consumption through SNSs, these distinctions 
translate into differences in information diets which can potentially lead to ideological 
segregation between users from different regions (Duvanova et al., 2016).
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In our article, we use data on demographic and geographic factors to analyse how 
these factors influence user involvement with partisan news communities on Vkontakte. 
Additionally, we employ data on linguistic factors – that is, if the users communicate in 
Ukrainian, Russian, or both languages. The importance of the language factor is attrib-
uted to the specific Ukrainian content, where the choice of a certain language is often 
viewed as an identity marker that makes it an important element of identity politics 
(Charnysh, 2013). It also aligns with existing observations on the significant difference 
in the way the events in Ukraine, in particular those related to the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict and its background, are presented in different language streams on SNSs (Etling, 
2014; Lyebyedyev and Makhortykh, 2018). Consequently, we examine these three cate-
gories of factors – demographic, geographic and linguistic – to provide a more detailed 
assessment of possible predictors of the Ukrainian users’ interest in partisan content. 
Thus, the third research question we examine in our article is:
RQ3: What is the relationship between demographic, geographic and linguistic fac-
tors and the consumption of pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian partisan news 
content?
Methodology
Similar to earlier studies on ideological segregation in the region (Duvanova et al., 2016; 
Gruzd and Tsyganova, 2015), we used data from Vkontakte, a popular Russian social 
media platform. Despite its ban in 2017 by the Ukrainian authorities, Vkontakte remains 
the seventh most popular website in Ukraine (Alexa, 2018) with approximately nine mil-
lion active users (Tikhonova, 2018). Besides its popularity in the state-controlled parts of 
Ukraine, Vkontakte is used extensively in the separatist state formations in Eastern 
Ukraine as well as Crimea (Szwed, 2016) for distributing partisan news content, which 
offers interpretations of the situation in Ukraine alternative to the ones provided by the 
mainstream Ukrainian outlets.
Using Vkontakte API, in June 2018, we collected publicly available data about a large 
sample of users from Ukraine (n = 50,702) together with the information about online 
communities to which these users subscribe. To avoid selection bias, we used a random 
sample of users. First, we generated a random sample of numerical user IDs and then 
filtered out from it only the Ukrainian users. For identifying whether a user was from 
Ukraine, we relied on Vkontakte profile data; specifically, we used profile sections which 
allow users to self-report their country of living, and included in the final sample users 
who stated that their country of living is Ukraine. For each user in the final sample, we 
extracted the profile data about their gender, age, languages they speak and their geo-
graphic location3; for the latter, we relied on Vkontakte profile fields which allow users 
to state the country and city where they live. Until now, Vkontakte identifies insurgent-
controlled territories in Eastern Ukraine as part of Ukraine, so our sample included 
Vkontakte users from these regions; in the case of Crimea, the situation is more compli-
cated, because Vkontakte attributes the peninsula differently, depending on the country 
of living stated in the user profile.
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After collecting user data, we used qualitative content analysis to analyse communi-
ties to which Ukrainian users subscribed. Using inductive coding, we classified all com-
munities which had more than 100 members from the initial sample (n = 4219) according 
to the type of content these communities promote. While doing so, we removed from the 
sample deleted or blocked communities (n = 24), so the final sample of the communities 
is slightly smaller (n = 4195). Our classification consists of five community types:
1. Commercial: Communities focused on advertising specific services or goods 
(e.g. gepur and clothes_staff);
2. Entertainment: Communities distributing entertainment content such as jokes or 
music (e.g. exclusive_muzic and chotkiy_paca);
3. News: Communities informing users about current events in Ukraine and/or 
abroad (e.g. tsnua and strelkov_info);
4. Politics: Communities devoted to political actors and parties (e.g. poroshenko.
petro); and
5. Technical: Communities focused on providing professional consultancy and help 
in relation to the technical aspects of Vkontakte (e.g. team and ua).
The classification was done by two coders, each of whom coded 2109 and 2110 com-
munities, respectively; then each coder coded 420 (20%) communities coded by the 
other coder to assess the degree of intercoder reliability. The resulting estimation of 
intercoder reliability measured with Krippendorff’s alpha is 0.94, which suggests that the 
degree of intercoder reliability is high.
Following the classification of communities by type, we focused on the news com-
munities and examined each of them to determine whether the community promotes 
partisan or non-partisan content. In the former case, we also noted whether the commu-
nity distributes pro-Ukrainian (e.g. by expressing unequivocal support for Ukrainian 
right-wing groups such as Pravyi Sector) or pro-Russian content (i.e. by expressing une-
quivocal support for pro-Russian state formations in Eastern Ukraine, such as Donetsk 
and Luhansk People’s Republics, or the annexation of Crimea). Two original coders 
examined all news communities (n = 112) and coded each of them as pro-Ukrainian, pro-
Russian or neutral. After producing the classification, both coders examined the resulting 
lists together and resolved disagreements through consensus coding.
After determining the partisan orientation of news communities, we used exploratory 
network analysis to determine whether partisan news communities form isolated clusters 
in the Vkontakte community topography. After identifying the position of news commu-
nities within the user-community network, we analysed the degree of ideological segre-
gation among the news consumers using the audience overlap approach (Webster and 
Ksiazek, 2012). This approach has been successfully applied to study audience fragmen-
tation (Fletcher and Nielsen, 2017) and polarisation between the audiences of partisan 
news outlets (Ksiazek, 2016), and to explore selective exposure among online news con-
sumers (Mukerjee et al., 2018; Nelson and Webster, 2017). Using a subset of users who 
subscribed to at least one news group from our list (n = 14,899), we constructed a news 
groups’ audience duplication network based on the audience-centric approach to audi-
ence fragmentation. The approach assumes that media environments are either 
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fragmented or duplicated: if the audiences of the majority of outlets overlap, then these 
environments are duplicated, whereas limited overlap indicates that these environments 
are fragmented and, in some cases, polarised (Ksiazek, 2011; Webster and Ksiazek, 
2012). In the resulting network, each node represents a news group; two nodes are con-
nected if their audiences overlap and the number of overlapping users is higher than the 
one which can occur by chance (for details, see Fletcher and Nielsen, 2017; Ksiazek, 
2011; Webster and Ksiazek, 2012). Afterwards, we applied community detection algo-
rithms to analyse the resulting network to see if there are clusters of tightly connected 
nodes – that is, the ones that have a significantly higher audience overlap with each other 
than with other news communities.
Finally, we analysed possible factors influencing users’ subscription to partisan 
news communities. Specifically, we looked at self-reported demographic variables 
(e.g. age and gender) as well as language preferences (e.g. Ukrainian or Russian); 
furthermore, we employed geographic variables (i.e. the region where users live), 
which, according to Duvanova et al. (2016), are important predictors of ideological 
segregation in Ukraine. Out of 14,899 users who subscribed to at least one news com-
munity, only 5001 provided information about all these variables. Data about these 
5001 users were used to build a logistic regression model (Ordinary Least Square) to 
examine variables which can be significant for predicting subscription to the partisan 
news groups.
Findings
News content within Vkontakte media ecology
We started our analysis by examining differences between subscriptions to different 
types of online communities among Ukrainian users in Vkontakte. Based on the results 
of our coding summarised in Table 1, we found that the vast majority of communities 
(95%) to which users subscribe are entertainment-oriented and deal with humour, cook-
ing and music. In contrast, news communities constitute a rather small number of com-
munities with 100+ subscribers from our sample: 112 out of 4206 (around 2.5%). 
Communities relating to political/public actors are even more underrepresented in our 
sample; the only community we found is devoted to the fifth president of Ukraine, Petro 
Poroshenko. These observations align with earlier studies (De Zuniga et al., 2012; 
Flaxman et al., 2016) on Western social media platforms (e.g. Facebook), which argue 
Table 1. Vkontakte community subscriptions by content type.
N of 
communities
N of unique 
subscribers
Average n of 
subscribers
Entertainment 4015 39,159 294
News 112 15,717 300
Politics 1 455 455
Technical 12 7429 926
Commerce 55 7449 207
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that news content constitutes only a small proportion of social media content, thus mak-
ing the impact of SNSs on news consumption questionable.
Despite the fact that the number of news communities on Vkontakte is relatively 
small, our observations also indicate that these communities are rather popular. 
Approximately 30 per cent of Vkontakte users from our sample subscribed to at least one 
news community, thus suggesting that these communities are more visible than com-
merce-oriented or Vkontakte service-oriented ones. In order to identify possible differ-
ences between the audiences of these communities, we examined the distribution of 
self-reported user data according to the type of community. Specifically, we looked at the 
self-reported gender and age of users together with declared knowledge of the Russian 
and Ukrainian languages and the region where users live.
As Table 2 indicates, the distribution of demographic variables showed little variance 
between different types of Vkontakte communities.4 The only exception is represented 
by the politics-related communities. However, these distinctions can be attributed to the 
data bias caused by the presence of only one such community in our sample. For all other 
types of communities, except Vkontakte service-oriented ones, users reporting their gen-
der as female are prevalent; similarly, in all four cases, the majority of users state that 
their age is either 30–49 or 18–24 years. Independently of the community type, more 
than half the users note that they speak only the Ukrainian language, with approximately 
Table 2. Vkontakte community subscriptions by content type and demographic variables.
Entertainment 
(%)






 Under 18 1540 (9) 645 (9) 29 (14) 291 (9) 302 (10)
 18–24 4861 (29) 1988 (30) 50 (24) 922 (29) 953 (30)
 25–29 3660 (22) 1451 (22) 47 (23) 679 (22) 678 (22)
 30–49 5454 (33) 2164 (32) 69 (34) 1044 (33) 998 (32)
 50+ 1126 (7) 455 (7) 11 (5) 228 (7) 205 (6)
Gender
 Female 15,049 (54) 6118 (54) 136 (43) 2578 (48) 3181 (60)
 Male 13,067 (46) 5126 (46) 182 (57) 2746 (52) 2158 (40)
Language
 Russian only 394 (8) 141 (8) 3 (2) 90 (7) 58 (6)
 Russian and Ukrainian 1761 (38) 760 (40) 27 (23) 472 (38) 358 (40)
 Ukrainian only 2527 (54) 971 (52) 88 (75) 671 (55) 481 (54)
Region
 Crimea 756 (2) 187 (1) 2 (1) 83 (2) 59 (1)
 Cent Ukr 10,239 (29) 3999 (28) 117 (40) 1416 (29) 1363 (29)
 East Ukr; state-controlled 5814 (16) 2446 (17) 32 (11) 743 (15) 747 (16)
 East Ukr; insurgent-
controlled
4164 (12) 1680 (12) 14 (5) 514 (10) 408 (9)
 South Ukr 4340 (12) 1775 (13) 22 (7) 614 (13) 557 (12)
 West Ukr 10,356 (29) 4154 (29) 107 (36) 1548 (31) 1644 (34)
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40 per cent mentioning both Ukrainian and Russian languages in their profiles. Relatively 
few users – between 6 and 8 per cent – state that they speak only Russian; such a mar-
ginal percentage of Russian-only speakers can be attributed to the increasing number of 
Russophone Ukrainians switching to the Ukrainian language since the beginning of the 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine (International Alert, 2017). Surprisingly enough, the number 
of self-reported bilinguals and Ukrainian-only speakers was also high among the users 
from Eastern Ukraine, including the ones in the insurgent-controlled areas.
The geographical distribution of users is similarly consistent between community 
types. In all four cases, the majority of users were either from Central or Western Ukraine; 
such user distribution reflects the general population trends in Ukraine, where these two 
regions are the most populous. The number of users from the separatist-controlled parts 
of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in our sample was relatively low and varied from 10 per 
cent to 14 per cent of users who stated where they live in their profiles. In the case of 
Crimea, the low numbers can be explained by the possibility of changing the attribution 
of the region to Russia introduced by Vkontakte in 2014. By contrast, the number of 
users from separatist-controlled parts of Ukraine was higher than we expected based on 
the population distribution: with approximately three million people living in DNR and 
LNR, the number of unique subscribers was the same as in the case of Southern Ukraine 
with roughly six million inhabitants (DSSU, 2017).
Together, our findings suggest that new communities constitute a relatively small part 
of the Vkontakte media ecologies in terms of community numbers that resonate with 
earlier studies (De Zuniga et al., 2012; Nielsen and Schrøder, 2014) arguing that the pres-
ence of news content on SNSs – as well as its impact on the public sphere – can be over-
estimated. At the same time, we observe that these communities attract rather significant 
attention from the users with approximately 30 per cent of all users from our sample 
being subscribed to news content. Our analysis also did not show significant differences 
in terms of the demographic/geographic profile of the subscribers to different types of 
communities: independently of the community type, the majority of Vkontakte users 
from our sample are Ukrainophone or bilingual speakers who belong to the young (18–
24) and middle (30–49) age groups who come primarily from Western and Central 
Ukraine.
Partisan news content on Vkontakte
After examining the general place of news content within the Vkontakte media ecology, 
we moved towards exploring the role of partisan news content. Table 3 summarises the 
distribution of news communities according to their ideological orientation and the 
number of user subscriptions. The summary shows that while the majority of news com-
munities promote non-partisan content, around 43 per cent of news communities propa-
gate partisan views. Contrary to the common assumption that Vkontakte is used for 
spreading pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine (see, for instance, The Economist, 2017), 
Table 3 suggests that the majority of partisan news communities to which Ukrainian 
users subscribe actually have pro-Ukrainian orientation; furthermore, the average num-
ber of subscribers is significantly higher for pro-Ukrainian news communities than for 
pro-Russian ones.
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After identifying the distribution of news communities among Ukrainian users, we 
moved towards examining user subscriptions to news content on Vkontakte using cluster-
ing analysis. Specifically, we employed a community detection algorithm by Blondel et al. 
(2008), which resulted in 17 distinct clusters (modularity = 0.562) as shown in Figure 1. 
The modularity rating was verified with other community detection algorithms, as, for 
example, walktrap (Gruzd and Tsyganova, 2015), which produced similar estimates.
Our examination of the resulting clusters supports earlier observations by Gruzd and 
Tsyganova (2015), who found that geography is a strong factor for the modularity clas-
sification. Specifically, we identified distinct clusters which united local news communi-
ties from the large Ukrainian cities (e.g. Odessa, Kharkiv, Kyiv and Lviv). Similarly, we 
identified a cluster of Luhansk/Donetsk local news communities; the latter cluster also 
includes the majority of pro-Russian partisan news communities, which might indicate 
the geographic focus of these groups.
We observed a similar connection between partisan news communities and regional 
news communities in the case of the largest cluster of our network, which ties pro-Ukrain-
ian partisan content with Western Ukrainian news communities. We also identified two 
distinct clusters of communities related to legacy news organisations (e.g. 1 + 1 TV chan-
nel and UNIAN news agency); these communities are grouped together, so potentially 
there might be a gap between the users who mostly subscribe to the legacy media news 
communities and users who consume news produced by alternative media. Finally, there 
are a few clusters focused on thematic news (e.g. sport); these clusters are located in the 
centre of the graph and act as ‘bridges’ between partisan news communities.
The results of the analysis of the audience fragmentation of these news communities 
based on the audience overlap approach (Webster and Ksiazek, 2012) suggest that news 
consumption on Vkontakte is characterised by rather high partisanship. As Figure 2 
shows, the audience overlap network of news communities is divided into tightly con-
nected modules; using the Louvain community detection algorithm (Blondel et al., 
2008), we calculated the modularity of this network, which is equal to 0.412.
The resulting graph shows clusters of pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian partisan news 
communities located at opposite poles with an in-between cluster of communities related 
to legacy media outlets as well as some non-partisan news content (e.g. technology and 
sport). The output of the community detection algorithms other than the Louvain algo-
rithm also emphasises the predominant presence of three major community clusters: 
pro-Ukrainian, pro-Russian and legacy media. These algorithms produced the following 
modularity scores: 0.443 for the Girvan-Newman (2002) algorithm and 0.46 for the fast 
greedy algorithm (Clauset et al., 2004). Similarities in the output of different algorithms 
Table 3. News communities by ideological orientation.
N of 
communities
N of unique 
subscribers
Average n of 
subscribers
Neutral 63 11,105 284
Pro-Russian 13 2131 182
Pro-Ukrainian 36 8060 369
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prove that our observations concerning the polarisation between the subscribers of the 
partisan pro-Ukrainian, partisan pro-Russian and traditional media news communities 
are quite robust.
The findings in this section suggest that partisan news communities constitute less 
than half of the news communities in our sample. Pro-Ukrainian partisan communities 
attract more users on average as compared with non-partisan news communities as well 
as pro-Russian communities, with the latter having a rather marginal position in terms of 
the number of users from our sample subscribing to this type of communities. We also 
found that pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian partisan communities have rather distinct 
positions within the user-communities network topography and their audiences show 
very limited overlap, thus contradicting Flaxman et al.’s argument (2016) about SNSs 
encouraging users’ exposure to views different from their own. A similar gap is present 
between the subscribers of communities associated with legacy media and alternative 
media; together, these observations suggest that Vkontakte does indeed enable ideologi-
cal segregation and that partisan news communities function as isolated ‘echo chambers’ 
whose subscribers have limited possibilities for experiencing opposing points of view.
Figure 1. The network of Ukrainian Vkontakte users and the news communities they follow 
(divided into clusters based on the network topology; the size of the nodes is proportional 
to the number of followers a community has; network layout is based on the Forced Atlas 2 
algorithm (Jacomy et al., 2014).
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Determinants of partisan news consumption
After detecting the low audience overlap between partisan news communities, we looked 
at the factors which can explain users’ interest in partisan news content. Following ear-
lier studies on partisan news consumption in Ukraine (Duvanova et al., 2016; Gruzd and 
Tsyganova, 2015), we assumed that the region in which users live can be an influential 
factor; the importance of this specific variable is connected to the long-term regional 
divide in the Ukrainian political sphere, where the western parts of the country tended to 
favour pro-Western politicians, whereas the eastern and southern regions gravitated 
towards pro-Russian candidates (Clem and Craumer, 2008). Additionally, we considered 
the self-reported language capabilities of users, their age and gender to see if linguistic 
and demographic factors influence partisan news consumption.
We used regression analysis to check the statistical significance of the variables men-
tioned above. We ran two separate logistic regressions to determine which demographic, 
geographic and linguistic variables can predict subscription to pro-Russian and pro-
Ukrainian partisan news communities. As mentioned earlier, after removing all NAs, we 
were left with 5001 users who provided information about the required variables. Of 
Figure 2. News groups’ audience duplication network.
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these users, 2784 subscribed to pro-Ukrainian communities and only 625 to pro-Russian 
communities. This, along with the earlier observations about the discrepancies between 
the numbers of pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian partisan communities (Table 3), puts the 
widespread statements about the spread of pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine through 
Vkontakte (The Economist, 2017) under scrutiny.
The results of the regression analyses are summarised in Tables 4 and 5. We used dif-
ferent predictors for each logistic model: the choice of specific predictors in each case 
was determined by the level of model fit. We performed likelihood ratio tests and calcu-
lated McFadden’s r-squared (McFadden, 1973) to find the best fitting set of predictors. 
For the model where a subscription to pro-Ukrainian partisan news communities was 
taken as the dependent variable, the best fitting combination of independent variables 
was Ukrainian language-speaking (binary), gender (binary) and region of residence (cat-
egorical). The latter variable was taken with seven categories. Besides distinguishing 
between the four regions of Ukraine (West, East, Central and South), we also distin-
guished between Ukrainian-controlled and separatist-controlled regions in the East and 
Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014. This division was taken because of the 
model fit. We also ran models where we did not distinguish between the separatist-con-
trolled and Ukrainian-controlled regions in the East and Crimea, but they had a worse fit 
to the data. McFadden’s r-squared for the final model is 0.89, which indicates that the 
model fits the data decently.
Based on the results of the regression analysis, we can state that Ukrainian speakers 
(i.e. users who declare on Vkontakte that they speak Ukrainian) are more likely to follow 
pro-Ukrainian partisan communities; similarly, females are more likely to follow pro-
Ukrainian communities than males. Finally, as expected, the declared residence in the 
separatist-controlled regions and Crimea is a very strong negative predictor of subscrip-
tion to pro-Ukrainian communities. Residence in the Ukraine-controlled eastern regions 
Table 4. Regression analysis results, predicting pro-Ukrainian partisanship.
Dependent variable Subscription to pro-Ukrainian communities
Independent variable Rating
 Language: Ukrainian only 0.364*** (0.089)
 Gender: male −0.196*** (0.061)
 Region
  Crimea −1.438*** (0.283)
  East Ukr; DNR −1.901*** (0.121)
  East Ukr; state-controlled −0.728*** (0.090)
  East Ukr; LNR −2.038*** (0.204)
  South Ukr −0.818*** (0.099)
  West Ukr 0.165** (0.082)
 Constant 0.727*** (0.067)
 Observations 5001
 Log likelihood −3127.935
 Akaike Inf. Crit. 6273.870
**p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. 
Urman and Makhortykh 15
and in the southern regions is also a strong negative predictor of subscription to pro-
Ukrainian communities. The only positive regional predictor of interest in pro-Ukrainian 
partisan communities is residence in Western Ukraine. This observation supports earlier 
findings about a strong pro-Ukrainian regional partisanship in the western part of the 
country (Clem and Craumer, 2008). It also suggests that the online news consumption 
patterns of users from Western Ukraine are rather different from those of users from 
other parts of the country, who exhibit less interest in pro-Ukrainian partisan news 
content.
For the logistic model, where a subscription to pro-Russian partisan communities was 
taken as a dependent variable, we used age (categorical) and region of residence (cate-
gorical, similar to the model for pro-Ukrainian partisanship) as independent variables. 
The choice, in this case, was also determined by the model fit with the mentioned com-
bination of variables providing the best results with McFadden’s r-squared equal to 0.63. 
This model did not fit as well as the one for pro-Ukrainian partisanship, but its perfor-
mance is acceptable since McFadden’s r-squared is still closer to 1 than to 0. The model 
shows that young people aged less than 18 years are more likely to subscribe to pro-
Russian partisan news communities than other age groups. The strongest predictors of 
interest in pro-Russian communities are, as expected, the declared residence in separa-
tist-controlled regions in Eastern Ukraine. We also found that residence in Western 
Ukraine is a statistically significant predictor of subscription to pro-Russian communi-
ties. This finding might look counterintuitive, considering that the same factor is also a 
positive predictor of the subscription to pro-Ukrainian communities; however, it can be 
attributed to the higher partisanship among residents of Western Ukraine as well as 
Table 5. Regression analysis results, predicting pro-Russian partisanship.
Dependent variable Subscription to pro-Russian communities
Independent variable Rating
 Age
  Under 18 0.371** (0.151)
  25–29 −0.100 (0.138)
  30–49 0.117 (0.117)
  50+ −0.063 (0.189)
 Region
  Crimea −0.961 (0.725)
  East Ukr; DNR 1.590*** (0.138)
  East Ukr; state-controlled 0.121 (0.154)
  East Ukr; LNR 1.864*** (0.190)
  South Ukr 0.159 (0.169)
  West Ukr 0.333** (0.130)
 Constant −2.478*** (0.128)
 Observations 5001
 Log likelihood −1766.222
 Akaike Inf. Crit. 3554.445
**p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. 
16 Global Media and Communication 00(0)
possible internal divisions along the political lines. We plan to further investigate this 
issue in follow-up analysis.
Our findings do not provide support to the argument of Taneja et al. (2018) about the 
differences in partisan news consumption being attributed to demographic variables (e.g. 
different age categories). Instead, in the case of Ukrainian SNS users, geographical – in 
particular, the self-declared region of residence – and linguistic variables seem to be 
particularly significant, thus supporting earlier findings by Duvanova et al. (2016) about 
the importance of these variables for political partisanship. These observations suggest 
that the existing factors of ideological segregation in the case of Ukraine remain highly 
relevant for partisan news consumption in online spaces.
Conclusions
In our paper, we examined the ideological segregation among Ukrainian users in online 
news communities using as a case platform Vkontakte, the largest SNS in the post-socialist 
space. Specifically, we were interested in how significant the presence of (partisan) news 
content on SNSs is in the case of conflict-ridden societies experiencing transition towards 
datafied media industries. Additionally, we tried to assess to what degree partisan news com-
munities enhance ideological segregation – that is, whether they entrap users within ‘filter 
bubbles’ (Pariser, 2011) or ‘echo chambers’ (Sunstein, 2017) – and what are the factors 
which can predict users’ interests towards partisan news content on SNSs.
Our findings partially align with a series of recent studies (Flaxman et al., 2016; Mukerjee 
et al., 2018; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2016) which suggest that concerns about the poten-
tial of SNSs to undermine shared public agenda are overrated. News communities constitute 
just a small drop in the digital ocean of entertainment content – even in the case of Ukraine, 
where SNSs assumingly are a major source of information about the recent developments in 
the country, in particular in relation to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.
At the same time, our observations point to the high degree of partisan news con-
sumption on Vkontakte that contradicts the assumption that SNSs encourage exposure to 
different views, and thus counter ideological segregation (Flaxman et al., 2016). Despite 
the relatively few number of partisan news communities, almost two-thirds of users 
interested in online news on Vkontakte subscribe either to pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian 
communities; in the former case, the average number of subscribers is higher as com-
pared with non-partisan news communities. Our observations also indicate that the audi-
ences of partisan news communities do not overlap; instead, their subscribers remain in 
self-chosen ‘echo chambers’ and have limited possibilities to expose themselves to 
opposing viewpoints. Such a selective exposure to a single ideological view increases 
ideological segregation and facilitates societal polarisation and potential radicalisation, 
which is a major concern for the already polarised Ukrainian society.
Finally, our investigation of factors which stimulate user subscription to partisan news 
content suggests that variables related to existing ideological divides – that is, geography 
or language-related ones – tend to be the strongest predictors of online partisanship. 
Unlike other studies (Taneja et al., 2018) which suggest that age tends to be a strong 
predictor of partisan news consumption online, we did not find evidence suggesting that 
younger Ukrainian users are more eager to subscribe to partisan news content. Instead, 
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our observations suggest that divisions between news consumers on Vkontakte repro-
duce – and potentially reinforce – existing ideological divides between the various 
Ukrainian regions (Duvanova et al., 2015).
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the study, in particular the use of 
self-reported user information on Vkontakte. Unlike traditional surveys, we have limited 
possibilities for verifying if the user’s declared age, gender or language abilities are true. 
This has limited impact on the detection of user overlap among audiences of partisan 
news communities; however, it has significant implications for the analysis of factors 
influencing users’ interest towards partisan content. In future research, we anticipate 
addressing this limitation by using profile cross-referencing.
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Notes
1. Following existing studies on media consumption in Ukraine in the post-2014 period (Gruzd 
and Tsyganova, 2015; Karamshuk et al., 2016), we use the term ‘partisan’ to denote news 
content which has strong pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian leanings.
2. This decision is explained by the limited applicability of the audience-based approach in the 
context of our study, considering in particular the limited amount of information about the 
geographical location of Vkontakte users (see more detailed discussion of data limitations in 
Methodology section) together with the massive relocation of the Ukrainian population trig-
gered by the conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Rushing, 2017) which complicates the identification 
of partisanship based on earlier voting patterns.
3. These data are subject to the usual limitations of optional self-reporting user profile data which 
often vary in quality and consistency (Chen et al., 2012; Irani et al., 2009). In the case of our 
sample, these limitations are reflected in often inconsistent reporting of demographic (e.g. age 
and gender) and linguistic (e.g. languages spoken) variables by Vkontakte users. One possible 
way of dealing with these limitations, which we will consider for future work, is the use of cross-
platform profile validation (e.g. by extracting additional data from the profiles of sampled users 
from other SNSs such as Odnoklassniki); however, in addition to the technical difficulties of such 
validation (e.g. limitations of APIs of other regional SNSs), the practical implementation of such 
a task is impeded by the frequent use of pseudonyms, in particular under the threat of the legal 
repercussions of subscribing to partisan news communities in Ukraine and Russia.
4. Such a uniform distribution of variables between different community categories can be 
attributed to the unequal amount of information self-reported by users who are more active 
subscribers – that is, users subscribing to a larger number of different communities – being 
also the ones self-reporting the most information about themselves.
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